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Abstract
If localization economies are present, rms within denser industry concentrations should ex-
hibit higher levels of performance than more isolated rms. Nevertheless, research in industrial
organization that has focused on the inuences on rm survival has largely ignored the poten-
tial e¤ects from agglomeration. Recent studies in urban and regional economics suggests that
agglomeration e¤ects may be very localized. Analyses of industry concentration at the MSA or
county-level may fail to detect important elements of intra-industry rm interaction that occur at
the sub-MSA level. Using a highly detailed dataset on rm locations and characteristics for Texas,
this paper analyses agglomeration e¤ects on rm survival over geographic areas as small as a single
mile radius. We nd that greater rm density within very close proximity (within 1 mile) of rms
in the same industry increases mortality rates while greater concentration over larger distances
reduces mortality rates.
JEL Classication: R12, O18.
Keywords: Firm Survival, Agglomeration, Localization, and Knowledge Externalities.
We want to thank Jan K. Brueckner, George Deltas, Timothy Dunne, Geo¤rey J. D. Hewings, Georgia Kosmopoulou,
Yoonsoo Lee, and participents at the IIOC 2010 conference for their helpful comments. We also would like to thank
Anita Schiller, and Mervin Ekanayake for their skillful research assistance and the Texas Workforce Commission for
providing the data.
yCorresponding author, email: dgdesilva@gmail.com. Department of Economics, Texas Tech University, MS: 41014,
Lubbock, TX 79409-1014.
zDepartment of Economics, Texas Tech University, MS: 41014, Lubbock, TX 79409-1014.
1
1 Introduction
Marshall hypothesized nearly a century ago that knowledge spillovers and shared human capital are
localized and help to explain why certain industries that are not otherwise tied to geographically spe-
cic inputs or demand tend to concentrate spatially. Geographic proximity of kindred rms should
foster human interaction, inter-rm labor mobility, and the exchange of knowledge. As an industrial
concentration grows and the localized knowledge base expands, the embedded rms enjoy aggregate
economies of scale which, in turn, should contribute to relatively higher growth rates of the geograph-
ically concentrated industry.
If these localization economies bestow advantages on rms in spatially concentrated industries, one
would naturally expect that entrants would have a preference toward spatial proximity to like rms.
Rosenthal and Strange (2003) nd evidence that localization inuences entrants location decisions
although the e¤ect diminishes rapidly over space. One would not only expect to see a relatively
higher rate of rm entry, however. The cost advantage derived from localization economies should lead
to higher industry performance and lower hazard rates, ceteris paribus, for kindred rms within the
spatial concentration. Indeed, Henderson (2003) nds that industrial localization at the county-level
has strong productivity e¤ects in the high tech industries.
The objective of this paper is to estimate the e¤ect of spatial concentration on the probability of
rm survival for a set of high technology industries in Texas. These relatively new industries have
exhibited a strong tendency to cluster. Using a highly detailed establishment-level data set for Texas,
we are able to observe key rm-level characteristics, including NAICS-6 industry classication, size,
ownership status, entry and exit dates (in case of mortality), and exact address. We then utilise,
inter alia, exact rm-level variations in intra-industry spatial concentration within concentric rings to
test the proposition that industrial localization inuences the likelihood of establishment exit. This
has the advantage of enabling us to observe exact measures of spatial concentration over precise
distances independently of arbitrary jurisdicational boundaries. Unlike previous industry studies in
this realm, we eliminate the own-rm contribution to the concentration measures to correctly identify
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the potential for localization e¤ects. We nd evidence that greater localization within very small
geographic areas contributes to rm mortality while localization e¤ects over a larger geographic area
reduce rm mortality.
It is surprising that the literature on failure rates has paid relatively scant attention to the e¤ect
of agglomeration economies on survival and exit rates for industries that tend to specialise geographi-
cally. This is particularly so since there has been an emphasis in this literature on the role of internal
economies of scale in rm survival and growth. Due to data limitations, much of the earlier analyses
utilized industry exit rates, since rm-specic characteristics were unavailable. However, even with
rm-level data, analyses have been rather more interested in ownership status, market conditions, tech-
nology uncertainty, and internal sources of decreasing long run average costs (Audretsch and Mahmood,
1994). The role of internal economies of scale and their e¤ect on rm protability and exit probabilities
have been primarily investigated within the context of the cost disadvantage inherent in operation at
less than minimum e¢ cient scale (see, for example, Audretsch, 2002). We are aware of a small number
of studies that look at industrial localization as a variable for explaining rm exits (Staber, 2001; Folta
et al., 2006; Shaver and Flyer, 2000). However, the present study di¤ers signicantly in its use of
exact and continuous measures of the geographic distribution of establishments.
2 Literature Review
The literature on rm survival has largely ignored agglomeration e¤ects. Dunne et al. (1988, 1989)
use plant-level panel data from the Census of Manufactures to analyze entry and exit from 4-digit SIC
industries at the establishment and multi-plant rm levels between the ve year intervals of the Census.
While they include concentration of ownership by way of multi-plant operation, their model does not
include any measure of spatial concentration of the given industry within the specic market regions.
In a similar vein, Baldwin and Gorecki (1991) analyze entry and exit with particular attention to the
e¤ects of rm characteristics at time of entry on prospects for survival. Others have investigated exit
rates relative to size, scale, organizational structure (Audretsch, (1991)), technology (Winter, (1984)),
market growth (Bradburg and Caves, (1982)) and pre-entry experience (see, Helfat and Lieberman
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(2002) for a review). Audretsch and Mahmood (1994, 1995) estimate hazard functions using rm-
specic data, but their treatment of scale economies focuses on internal factors while recognition
of the technological environment is limited to higher costs due to higher levels of R&D or greater
technological uncertainty in more technologically advanced and dynamic industries. Dunne et al.
(2005) are primarily interested in the role of producer experience in rm survival.
The few studies that have looked at spatial concentration and rm failure rates have concluded that
higher concentration is associated with higher mortality (Folta et al., 2006; Shaver and Flyer, 2000;
Staber, 2001). As Shaver and Flyer (2000) point out, if rms are heterogeneous, knowledge spillovers
will likely benet weaker rms more than stronger rms. If weaker rmscompetitiveness is bolstered
by spatial proximity to stronger rms, particularly strong rms may perceive that they have more to
lose than to gain by close proximity to competitors. The implication is that spatial concentrations
may tend to attract weaker rms and repel entrants that have stronger intellectual properties to
commercialise. Although Folta et al. (2006) advise caution in the use of survival as a single measure
of rm performance within industry concentrations, they suggest that the higher mortality rates for
rms in denser concentrations may be due to higher performance expectations and lower exit costs.
They also point out, as does Henderson et al. (1995), that net agglomeration economies may be non-
linear. In the early growth phase of an industry cluster, positive agglomeration economies dominate.
However, congestion e¤ects become relatively more important as the concentration grows and matures.
The role of agglomeration economies has been carefully investigated in the context of rm entry
and growth. Rosenthal and Strange (2003) nd that localization helps to explain entry patterns.
Of rather more interest has been research into the e¤ect of agglomeration economies on local or
regional employment growth rates at the industrial level, seeking to determine whether localization
or urbanization e¤ects, or both, are present [Glaeser et al. (1992), Henderson et al. (1995), Combes
(2000)]. More recently, researchers have considered e¤ects at the rm level. Henderson (2003) nds
that greater localized rm counts in the high tech industries has signicant productivity e¤ects at the
rm level. Fafchamps (2004), looking at manufactuirng rms in Morocco, concludes that agglomeration
has an e¤ect on rm growth rates, but it is not working through productivity.
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Combes (2000) notes that localized information spillovers occur when rms have complementary
pieces of information that are exchanged through localized relationships. The greater the number of
rms, the greater the likelihood that complementarities occur. He describes these pieces of information
as relating to rm or market organization and input or output innovations, the latter being referred
to as a technological externality. One might think that innovations in any of these realms might
su¢ ce to inspire an entrepreneur and result in a start-up. Henderson et al. (1995) envision the
magnitude of localized knowledge externalities at any given time as the result of a dynamic process, the
Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) externality. That is, a shared, localized knowledge base accumulates
through time as collective learning and growth of experience takes place.1 This dynamic element would
presumably also characterize the extent of knowledge and experience of individual rms.
If important knowledge spillovers are present, one can then easily imagine why start-up rms would
choose to locate among kindred rms. By denition, new rms lack experience. Thus, if the relevant
spillovers are, as Henderson et al. (1995) suggest, a non-excludeable knowledge base (technical and
market "know-how" that accrues through time) that is shared by all localized rms, the entering rm
could expect to be up to speed quicker by embedding itself in an existing concentration. New rms
contributions to the knowledge base would occur as the rms gain unique, substantive experience and
so acquire, or enable others to acquire, unique bits of knowledge that circulate within the locality.
The key observation for us is that new rms would apparently have much more to gain by entering
into a spatially concentrated environment than incumbent rms gain from their entry. Indeed, if
entry into the locality sharpens competition for inputs and the extension of shared knowledge in an
increasingly competitive environment has the e¤ect of accelerating the pace of innovation, rates of
return to R&D will fall, as pointed out by Combes (2000). The marginal e¤ect of rival rm density
may be negative. On the other hand, each potential start-up would have to balance the benets
from gaining access to the knowledge spillovers with the costs of the leakage of its own intellectual
property, or, more generally, its R&D, due to its imperfect excludeability. In the absence of any entry
barriers, entry would occur up to the point where risk-adjusted expected prots would be equalized
1Glaeser et al. (1992) refer to these dynamic localization e¤ects as Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) externalities.
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across localities. Higher expected prots that accrue to economies of scale available from location in
a denser concentration would have to be balanced by greater risk.
Moreover, given the relatively greater riskiness of new rms compared to more mature rms, co-
location with similar rms may enhance the new rmsability to attract employees. This would be the
case if, for example, workers consider the higher risk of failure associated with employment in a new
rm to be mitigated by virtue of its location within a spatial concentration of similar rms. That is,
if workers believe that localized social and professional networking increases their labor mobility, they
would prefer, all else equal, to work for a rm within an industry concentration. Indeed, Freedman
(2008) nds greater spatial concentration in the software publishing industry results in greater mobility
of labor.
Krugman (1991) poses the question, how far does a technological spillover spill?2 Most of the
earlier studies of knowledge externalities were conducted at relatively aggregated industry levels and
over relatively large geographic areas. Manseld (1995), among others, uses U.S. states as the geo-
graphic division while counties and Metropolitan Statistical Areas have been common geographical
boundaries for analysis. Henderson (2003) concludes that plants in clusters located in di¤erent coun-
ties within the same MSA do not benet from clusters beyond their own, other than from access to
shared sources of production inputs. Using ner spatial focus, Wallsten (2001) nds that knowledge
spillovers are limited to a radius on the order of 1/10 of a mile (or about two city blocks). This sug-
gests that the e¤ective locality is a neighborhood, not even a city, and certainly signicantly smaller
than counties and MSAs. Rosenthal and Strange (2003) provide a relevant quote in Saxenian (1994)
from a technology industry employee in Silicon Valley who said, The joke is that you can change
jobs and not change parking lots.Looking at start-up rms at the Zip Code level, they conclude that
agglomeration economies attenuate rapidly up to a distance of one mile.
Complicating the matter further is the relevance of time. Ja¤e et al. (1993) nd a temporal
component to the localization of knowledge. In high tech industries, the rate of product innovation
and market evolution is extraordinarily rapid. If important elements of localized knowledge have a
2Krugman (1991), page 485.
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brief shelf life and knowledge di¤uses slowly through space, there is a premium on close proximity since
its eventual di¤usion beyond the locality is largely irrelevant.
If own-industry knowledge spillovers dissipate very rapidly across space, the search for localization
externalities needs to be conducted within a nely grained geographical focus. Signicant localization
e¤ects may not reach a threshold for detection if the spatial unit under observation is the MSA
while the appropriate geographical area is sub-metropolitan in size. Measures of urban specialization
across the larger geography will understate the actual and relevant industrial density and perhaps
overstate the role of industrial diversity. Employment location quotients as a specialization measure,
for example, tend toward 1 as the geographic extent of the measurement region is expanded. This has
clear implications for observational distinctions between MAR and Jacobs-type externalities.3
In the analysis that follows, we analyze the e¤ect of agglomeration economies on high-tech rm
survival. We do not have an a priori hypothesis of the e¤ects of industrial density on survival.
Combes (2000) notes, "Since competition generates opposite e¤ects on the level of local R&D and
innovations, its e¤ect is also indeterminate on local technological spillovers." Using variation in rm-
specic measures of spatial density, within circles of varying radii, we seek too analyze the e¤ect of
localization on high tech rm hazard rates.
3 Empirical Model and Data
The high-technology industries considered in this paper have come to represent the new knowledge
economy.These industries are ideal candidates to benet from the presence of specialized, high skill
labor inputs and knowledge spillovers. Indeed, one of our criteria for designation as a high-tech industry
is the relatively high employment of scientists and engineers in its labor force. The other criterion is
relatively high levels of industry R&D. (These criteria are discussed in more detail below.)
We adapt the model found in Rosenthal and Strange (2003) to the question of rm survival. That
is, if prices are normalized to 1, prot-maximizing establishment js prots in industry i in period t
3See Jacobs (1969).
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can be expressed as
jit(x; ) = max
z
a(xjit)f(z)(1 + ij)  c(z) (1)
where a(x) is a shift term that depends on a vector x = (xl; xu; xj) consisting of both localization
and urbanization variables as well as other characteristics that are particular to rm j. The vector
xl contains localization e¤ects as captured by rm density measures, as explained below. Both the
production (revenue) technology f(z) and the cost function c(z) depend on a vector of factor inputs z.
Production technology is common to all rms in the industry. A rm will remain active in the market
as long as long as jit > 0 and will exit if jit < 0, assuming that current period prots will persist.
We assume ijt is a random draw for each rm in a given industry in each period and is independent and
identically distributed across establishments in each industry according to the cumulative distribution
function H(i).
Thus, given the solution to (1), z0, the rm will exit in a given period if
ijt <
c(z0)
a(xjit)f(z0)
  1 (2)
There is then a probability h(t) = H(jt) that a rm will exit the industry in any given period
t. If agglomeration economies vary positively with spatial density, i.e., greater density results in a
higher value of a(x), greater spatial density will correspond to a lower value of H(j), all else equal.
Therefore, the probability is higher that the rm will survive the period.
We estimate probabilities of rm failure using a Cox proportional hazards model. The basic Cox
proportional hazards model can be written as follows:
h(t) = h0(t) exp(x
0
 + z
0
 ) (3)
where h(t) is the conditional hazard rate and h0(t) is the unspecied baseline hazard function. The
vectors of covariates that are establishment specic are denoted by x and the market condition variables
are denoted by z.
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In order to gauge the geographic extent of localization e¤ects, we use an approach similar to
Rosenthal and Strange (2003). However, we compute alternative spatial density measures within
concentric rings of 0-1, 1-5, 5-10, and 10-25 mile radii around each rms exact location for every high-
tech rm in Texas during the period of the study. Unlike Rosenthal and Strange (2003), the density
measures are based on the actual physical addresses of rms and employment. After geo-coding each
establishment by physical address, we compute the distance between each establishment and all other
establishments both in the same industry and in all other industries.4 Therefore, as Duranton and
Overman (2005) point out, space is treated as continuous so that the measures of the distribution of
activity are independent of any city, county or other arbitrary jurisdictional division. We limit our
analysis to a maximum radius of 25 miles since that corresponds roughly to the typical Texas county.
In Texas, nearly all counties are square and half of the diagonal distance within a county is an average
of about 23 miles. Since the geographic areas over which these measures are computed are identical for
all rms, no additional spatial normalization is necessary. Freedman (2008) using a data set similar to
ours, calculated the location quotient for each establishment by drawing concentric circles with radii
of 5, 10, and 25 miles around each rm.
We compute local densities using both location quotients (LQ) and count data in terms of employ-
ment. The conventional LQ is a measure of an industrys presence in a particular location compared
to the general spatial distribution of economic activity. For a given industry, the LQ is calculated
as the ratio of its share of total employment in a sub-region relative to that industrys share of total
employment in the broader region. In our case, we compute the LQ for each ring around each rm
relative to the State of Texas. A rm and its employment are excluded from density measures in any
ring in which the rm is located.
The calculated rivalsLQ can be expressed using the following equation.
LQrji =

Erji=Erj
Ei=E

(4)
4The distances were computed under the assumption the world is at, using trigonometric functions with latitude
and longitude as arguments. The distances are typically small enough that curvature of the earth introduces relatively
small errors.
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Where, Erji is the number of employees around establishment j in industry i (by six digit NAICS
codes) and Erj is the total number of employees in all industries around establishment j within radius
r for rl < r  ru. The values rl and ru are the lower and upper values of the radii dening the four
concentric rings dened above. Ei is the total number of employees in Texas for industry i and E is
the total number of employment for all non-farm industries in Texas.
We obtained the rm-level data for Texas from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
(QCEW) from the Texas Workforce Commission. This data set provides rm-specic monthly employ-
ment and quarterly total wages reported by establishment as required under the Texas unemployment
insurance (UI) program. Each record includes the specic location (address) of the establishment,
business start-up date (the date on which UI liability begins), and the relevant six-digit NAICS code.
Furthermore, separate establishments (branches or franchises) of the same rm are separately identi-
ed and reported in separate records. This panel data set is comprized of observations from Q3:1999
through Q2:2007.5
Denition of the high-technology sector is necessarily somewhat arbitrary. This paper utilises the set
of high tech industries specied by the American Electronics Association (now known as TechAmerica)
in 2003 roughly the mid-point of the timeframe for this studyand based on the 2002 NAICS scheme.
It includes 49 industries identied at the NAICS-6 level. The American Electronics Associations
prinipal selection criterion is that an industry be a "maker/creator of technology, whether it be in the
form of products, communications, or services." See Table A1 for a list of industries that constitute
the high tech sector in this analysis. In our data set, we have more than 20,000 technology rms
(more than 25,000 establishments) and 380,000 total observations. From these, we identify separately
the entrants with previous experience.6 Figure 1 illustrates the location of high-tech establishments
in Texas and shows their spatial concentration along Interstate 35. One can also note a sprinkling of
high-tech establishments across the less urban areas of the state. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the intra-
urban spatial distribution of software publishing establishments in the Austin and Dallas Metropolitan
5 It should be pointed out that the authors obtained these data under an agreement of condentiality and disclosure
of the actual data is subject to certain restrictions.
6Entrant with previous experience is a rm that enters the market but has previously been in the industry under
prior ownership.
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Figure 1: High-Tech Firm Locations in Texas
Statistical Areas. Spatial clustering at this level is also evident.
The software publishing industry accommodates rms whose activities are diverse in terms of the
nature of the software they produce. Given the large number (approximately 2,000) of software
publishing establishments in Texas and the necessity of examining each establishment in order to
determine its place in the software product space, it is di¢ cult to sort establishments by product
characteristics in order to view the spatial distribution by this particular sub-category. We have,
however, included in Tables 1 and 2 some micro-characteristics of co-located establishments. Table
1 considers a sample of the software publishing rms that are located in the same building and the
order in which their appearance at that location took place. We do not identify the cities in order to
ensure anonymity of the rms. While the establishments are almost all involved in applications software
publishing, we conclude that eight of the sets of establishments in the fteen buildings are composed of
potentially direct rivals or establishments in a similar product space. In all cases, the establishment with
the longer tenancy has more employees and, on average, a higher average payroll. Table 2 illustrates
11
Figure 2: Spatial Distribution of Establishments for Software Publishers in Austin MSA
Figure 3: Spatial Distribution of Establishments for Software Publishers in Dallas MSA
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the characteristics of the 31 establishments located within 5 miles of a randomly selected software
publishing rm indicated as rm 1. We note, again, that nearly all of the establishments are involved
in the production of applications software. It is also worth noting that about one-third, or more,
are involved in business software development, four are in communications and utility management
software, two in game development, and two clearly publishing in healthcare industry-related software.
In the case of the broader set of high tech industries, transportation costs as an agglomerating force
and access to geographically specic natural resources are not particularly relevant. High-tech rms are
not typically tied to local or regional market demand and do not have signicant upstream industrial
linkages other than, perhaps, research universities, expert consultants, and specialized funding sources.
Of these upstream linkages, we control for the level and proximity of university research by including a
dummy variable for the local presence of a research university or institution. Local presence is dened
as being in the same county as the establishment. A research university or institution is identied as
one which has received at least $10 million in federal research support during any federal scal year
during the period of this analysis. Using this criterion, there are ten counties in Texas which qualify
as hosting a research complex. Data on annual university R&D expenditures were obtained from the
National Science Foundation. The annual NSF data actually span two calendar years since the federal
scal year begins in October. In order to convert these annual R&D expenditures into quarterly data,
we use a fourth of a scal years total for quarters 1-3, and a fourth of the given scal years total for
quarter 4 of the previous calendar year.
In order to measure the urbanization e¤ect, we compute urban density for all non-farm industries,
excluding the industry in which the rm under observation is located, using analogous measures as
were used for localization e¤ects. However, in this case, we only compute density measures for the
number of establishments and employment for the entire area within a 25 mile radius. We compute
these measures as both LQs and count data. We also compute a Herndahl Index to capture the
industrial diversity in the 25 mile circle. The Herndahl Index is the sum of squared employment
shares at the 4-digit NAICS. We include this measure to capture the possibility that urban industrial
diversity generates external e¤ects (Jacobs-type) that are relevant to rm survival probabilities. A
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positive coe¢ cient on this variable can be interpreted to mean that less industrial diversity (higher
HHI) tends to generate higher mortality. In that case, establishments in regionally specialized areas
would have higher mortality rates, ceteris paribus, than establishments located in industrially diverse
urban areas.
In addition to the localization and urbanization e¤ects, the set of establishment-specic variables
also includes age of the rm in months, average payroll, and relative size of the rm. Regional measures
include the county unemployment rate, proportion of county population between 24-54 years, and rural
land price.
Age of the rm in months is the period of time since UI liability began. This is reported for all
rms. Therefore, despite the fact that the data set starts in 1999, we can observe the actual start-up
date for all rms. Average payroll is the rms total payroll for the quarter divided by average monthly
employment for the quarter. This method for approximating wage rates is fairly common in the labor
economics literature (Freedman, 2008; De Silva et. al. 2010; Dube 2007, 2010). Relative size of the
rm is the ratio of its current employment to its industrys total employment within a 25 mile radius.
The proportion of the county population between 24-54 years old is taken from the Census Bureaus
Annual Population Estimates. This variable serves as a proxy for the technological savvy of the
workforce and assumes younger workers are more comfortable with rapidly evolving technologies. While
educational characteristics would be preferable, they are not available for a majority of Texas counties.
To account for factor costs, we use the yearly median rural land price in each of 33 land market
regions in Texas for the counties comprising the region as reported by the Texas A&M Real Estate
Center. As a second measure, we use the average quarterly payroll for the individual rm. The
county unemployment rate for the nal month in each quarter, as reported by the Texas Workforce
Commission, is also included to provide an indication of the overall economic conditions in the local
county.7
While some studies of industry exit attempt to capture nancial market conditions by including
7The TWC unemployment rate is the average rate for the calendar year. We average consecutive years beginning with
year 1999-2000 since that best overlaps our denition of a year as running from third quarter through second quarter of
the following calendar year.
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the prime rate, it seems unlikely that high tech rms rely in critical ways on bank nancing (Audretsch
and Mahmood, 1995). The key measure of access to nancial resources should capture conditions in
either venture capital or public equity markets. We attempt to capture these inuences by including
the NASDAQ index at the previous quarterly close. The NASDAQ has been more closely associated
with the technology sector than other stock exchanges. We assume that a rising index reects greater
market willingness to provide equity funding.
Since rms can have more than one establishment, establishment-level observations for each indus-
try are not likely to be independent over time. Note, the sample consists of 25,279 establishments
with 389,343 observations that capture current quarterly rm characteristics until they fail or are right
censored. Therefore, we use clustered standard errors by rm.8 We assume that the error term is
independent across rms but not necessarily within a rm over time.9
4 Results and Discussion
Table 3 contains summary statistics for both localized density measures at the NAICS-6. The second
column reports the proportion of rms for which the average LQ of its rivals is greater than 1 as
calculated for each radius band (donut). The third column reports the density measures based on
number of rivals. Note the pattern that is observed in both columns as distance increases; the densities
rst decrease and then tick up across the 5-10 and 10-25 mile rings. This would be consistent with an
urban spatial pattern of discrete sets of commercial buildings distributed across a metropolitan region.
Table 4 reports the summary statistics of the variables used in this study.
Table 5 contains the results of the proportional hazard estimations using rivalsLQ dummy and
rival rm count density measures. Column 1 reports results for the LQ estimation without any other
rm or county controls. This is intended as a simple test of our hypothesis that localization a¤ects rm
survival. Column 3 reports the results for the estimations using rm count as the density measures.
Estimation results based on the di¤erent measures of intra-industry rm densities do not di¤er in
8 In regressions we do not consider self-employed workers (rms).
9We use the Breslow-Peto approximation to break ties.
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Table 3: Agglomeration measures by radius.
Radius For All TX Firms
RivalsEmployee Based LQ > 1 Number of Rival Firms
1  mile .550 11.655
(.498) (46.495)
> 1 5  miles .023 .717
(.149) (2.681)
> 5 10  miles .034 1.317
(.182) (4.627)
> 10 25  miles .062 5.868
(.241) (14.673)
For All MSA Firms
1  mile .543 11.948
(.498) (47.128)
> 1 5  miles .023 .734
(.150) (2.713)
> 5 10  miles .035 1.350
(.182) (4.685)
> 10 25  miles .063 6.015
(.244) (14.818)
For All Non-MSA Firms
1  mile .788 1.639
(.409) (5.444)
> 1 5  miles .011 .123
(.104) (.980)
> 5 10  miles .023 .179
(.150) (1.272)
> 10 25  miles .021 .844
(.143) (6.556)
Standard deviations are in parentheses
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Table 4: Summary statistics.
Variable Mean
(Standard deviation)
Startups .234
(.423)
Employment ratio: 25  miles .190
(.274)
Employment based HHI: 25  miles (4 digit NAICS) .396
(.206)
Firm with prior experience .322
(.467)
Average number of employees per rm 44.304
(345.170)
Current quarterly average wage rate 15,925.56
(13,033.78)
Average age in months 112.811
(144.78)
County unemployment rate 5.4986
(1.225)
Average total population in counties between ages 24 and 54 66,1356.10
(51,5557.50)
Other rm density: 25  miles 50,929.45
(32,642.30)
County amenity LQ .963
(.221)
Undeveloped land price 601.375
(265.446)
NASDAQ 2097.142
(670.513)
Probability of being located in an MSA county .972
(.166)
Probability of being located in an knowledge center county .713
(.452)
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Table 5: Hazard estimates for high-tech rms in Texas (all rms).
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Startups .549*** .386*** .629*** .584*** .590***
(.045) (.058) (.044) (.059) (.060)
RivalsLQ > 1 dummy: 1  mile .224** .117**
(.046) (.048)
RivalsLQ > 1 dummy: > 1  5  miles -.291* -.365**
miles (.186) (.184)
RivalsLQ > 1 dummy: > 5  10  miles -.283* -.374**
miles (.148) (.148)
RivalsLQ > 1 dummy: > 10  25  miles .038 -.072
miles (.091) (.093)
Log number of rivals: 1  mile .401*** .416*** .417***
(.013) (.015) (.018)
Log number of rivals: > 1  5  miles .062 .081 .091
(.058) (.058) (.058)
Log number of rivals: > 5  10  miles .074 .057 .059
(.052) (.052) (.052)
Log number of rivals: > 10  25  miles -.151*** -.164*** -.144***
(.033) (.035) (.035)
Employment ratio within 25 miles -1.095*** -.731***
(.117) (.113)
Employment based HHI: 25  miles -.372**
(4 digit NAICS) (.151)
Firms with prior experience -.196*** -.202*** -.251***
(.052) (.052) (.052)
Current quarterly average wage -.151*** -.182*** -.186***
rate (Log) (.035) (.034) (.035)
Age in months (Log) -.055** .015 .009
(.018) (.019) (.019)
County unemployment rate .032 .043** .044**
(.020) (.019) (.019)
Total population in county between -.019 -.080** -.087**
ages 24 and 54 (Log) (.037) (.039) (.039)
Unban density: 25  miles (Log) .022 -.029 -.016
(.032) (.034) (.034)
County amenity LQ -.086 -.028 -.034
(.110) (.105) (.104)
Undeveloped land price (Log) .070 .308*** .306***
(.053) (.055) (.054)
NASDAQ (Log) -.119 -.241** -.242**
(.090) (.083) (.083)
MSA county .147 .264* .243
(.162) (.161) (.160)
Knowledge center county .119 .040 .047
(.082) (.086) (.086)
Industry e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of establishments 24646 24646 24646 24646 24646
Number of failures 2240 2240 2240 2240 2240
Wald 2 592.886 47624.944 1487.810 1600.900 97400.904
*** Denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** denotes statistical signicance at the 5 percent level,
and * statistical signicance at the 10 percent level. Robust standard errors clustered by rms are in parentheses
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substantive ways. Both measures produce coe¢ cient estimates that are positive and highly signicant
for the radius up to 1 mile. The signs on the coe¢ cients for both intra-industry density measures
become both negative and signicant as the rings become more distant.
The positive and signicant coe¢ cients on both of the intra-industry density measures for the
area within a radius of one mile implies that greater concentration over a relatively short distance is
associated with higher failure rates, not lower. This e¤ect, however, appears not to extend beyond
one mile. This result is similar to the results of Shaver and Flyer (2000) and Folta et al. (2006).
It is inconsistent with the assumption that greater concentration results in net positive localization
economies for these industries. This is suggestive of more vigorous competition among rms (both in
product space and for inputs) as a result of closer spatial location that, as Rosenthal and Strange found
in the case of the e¤ects of density on entry, attenuates quite rapidly. Firms that are located somewhat
more apart further than one mileenjoy the benets of the agglomeration without the competitive
e¤ects. While suggestive, however, it provides no direct evidence that knowledge externalities are
present and negative.
The estimates of the coe¢ cients of the variables from the LQ and count density regressions are
qualitatively nearly identical. Firms with higher employment shares (larger rms) within 25 miles
have a higher rate of survival. Firms with prior experience (or rms that changed hands) have
relatively lower hazard rates. This observation is in line with Dunne et al. (2005). Results indicate
that relatively olderrms have a lower hazard rate. Workforce characteristics are signicant with
expected signs.
The urban density variable is positive. This indicates that greater spatial density of rms in
other industries contributes to mortality, suggesting that net total urbanization forces have a negative
inuence on rm survival. As one might easily imagine, greater urban density brings both benets
and costs. While providing greater diversity and specialization of inputs, greater urban density means
greater congestion costs and higher factor costs as real estate prices and commercial lease rates are
bid up. From experience, the authors of this paper know that commuting times during rush hour
in Austin, TX were extraordinary during the decade of the 1990s and into the new century as the
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citys transportation infrastructure struggled to catch up to regional growth driven by the high tech
sector. In industries where high levels of human capital are key, the negative coe¢ cient on average
quarterly wages could be explained by the fact that Texas rms that pay higher wages are able to
retain more talented workers and enjoy higher levels of performance. Since the QCEW data base only
reports the number of employees for whom unemployment insurance is paid and total payroll, another
possibility is that the average payroll increases due to additional hours worked for a given number of
insured employees when business is good. On the other hand, the sign on the HHI variable is positive,
suggesting that rms benet from greater industrial diversity.
The sign on the lagged NASDAQ variable is as expected and quite signicant. As a bellwether of
technology rmsability to raise capital, a rising NASDAQ index is consistent with higher survival
rates. The high tech sector has been characterized by high levels of rm start-ups that relied on venture
capital inputs for initial growth phases and public equity market o¤erings (IPO) to establish longer
term viability. Finally university R&D expenditures appear to have no e¤ect on hazard rates, echoing
the results of De Silva and McComb (2010).
There may be selection issues in the above estimations. Higher failure rates would be observed if a
disproportionate share of the localized rms are weak relative to the universe of rms in the industry
and more likely to fail for reasons otherwise unrelated to spatial density. This problem would be
exacerbated if existing clusters attract more entry, and entrants, as new rms, are more likely to fail.
To avoid this problem, we focus only on rms that had been in operation for at least 36 months prior to
the beginning of the period under analysis. In this sample, we exclude any rm that entered during the
period from Q3:1997 through Q2:2000. These "established" rms, which we term "incumbent rms,"
have demonstrated some degree of sustained ability to compete within the industry. By limiting the
sample to these "incumbent rms," it is our view that the question of selection bias is mitigated.
Table 6 reports results from both the LQ and count density estimations for "incumbent rms" only.
It can be seen that qualitative results for localization e¤ects do not change. The estimated coe¢ cients
for density within 1 mile, for both density measures, are positive and statistically signicant. Note
that the estimate of the coe¢ cient of the dummy variable for rivalsLQ greater than one suggests a
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Table 6: Hazard estimates for high-tech rms in Texas that entered before July 1997.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RivalsLQ > 1 dummy: 1  mile .341*** .190**
(.086) (.089)
RivalsLQ > 1 dummy: > 1  5  -.257 -.365
miles (.387) (.386)
RivalsLQ > 1 dummy: > 5  10  -.839** -.932**
miles (.344) (.343)
RivalsLQ > 1 dummy: > 10  25  -.545** -.710***
miles (.208) (.210)
Log number of rivals: 1  mile .490*** .526*** .523***
(.023) (.027) (.035)
Log number of rivals: > 1  5  miles -.141 -.121 -.113
(.135) (.136) (.138)
Log number of rivals: > 5  10  miles -.118 -.142 -.138
(.098) (.100) (.101)
Log number of rivals: > 10  25  miles -.158** -.161** -.148**
(.066) (.069) (.070)
Employment ratio within 25 miles -1.195*** -.618**
(.201) (.195)
Employment based HHI: 25  miles -.399
(4 digit NAICS) (.321)
Firm controls No Yes No Yes Yes
Market controls No Yes No Yes Yes
Industry e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of establishments 9134 9134 9134 9134 9134
Number of failures 694 694 694 694 694
Wald 2 715.097 1277.943 1484.502 2475.291 144958.02
*** Denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** denotes statistical signicance at the 5 percent level,
and * statistical signicance at the 10 percent level. Robust standard errors clustered by rms are in parentheses
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separate e¤ect of the greater density on mortality of about 24%. The estimates, where signicant,
change sign as distance increases beyond the immediate ring. As would be expected, the relative size
of the rm has a negative and signicant relationship with mortality rates as reported in columns 2
and 4 of Table 6. We also examined these exit probabilities using simple probit regressions and found,
once again, that qualitative results are unchanged. We do not report these estimates, but they can
be provided upon request.
We report hazard rates for "entrant rms" in Table 7 where "entrant rms" denotes rms that
entered between Q3:2000 and Q2:2004. This allows us to track entrants for at least three years. More
importantly, we are able to observe density measures in the cluster at the time the rm enters the
industry. The results on initial density measures, in our view, are consistent with the Rosenthal
and Strange (2003) nding that localization economies have a positive inuence on entrantslocation
decisions, although the e¤ect diminishes rapidly over space. It woould appear, as we reasoned above,
that density o¤ers new rms initial opportunities for greater prots but bears higher longer-term risk,
particularly as the degree of spatial concentration increases. Greater density in the more distant rings
again appears to reduce hazard rates. We also examine the exit probabilities using simple probit
regressions and nd that the qualitative results are the same. These results can be provided upon
request.
The high tech sector experienced a signicant contraction during the period 2000-2002 following
the bursting of the "dot.com" bubble in March 2000. Although we control for market conditions
by including the NASDAQ variable, anecdotal evidence suggests that the latter part of the decade
of the 1990s was characterized by relatively abundant venture capital and the ability of unprotable
Internet-related rms, in particular, to locate external sources of nancing. As gure 4 Panel A1and
A2 illustrate, while the number of high tech rms declined sharply duirng the period 2000-2002 both in
terms of net births/deaths, this decline also resulted in a thinning of the spatial concentration on the
high tech industries in Texas. This is seen by the sharp decrease in the average numbers of rms in the
same industry within rings proximate to each rm. This is of course consistent with our nding that
mortality rates are higher in denser concentrations. However, by the start of 2003, the total number
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Figure 4: High tech rm densities and net gains by radius
of rms and the level of spatial concentration within the industries appear to have stabilized, as can
be seen in Figure 4 Panels B1and B2.
This contractionary period undoubtedly reduced heterogeneity among rms within industries as
weaker rms were weeded out and provides some additional opportunity to control for unobserved rm
heterogeneities. We re-estimate the model using only post-2002 observations on rms that survived
the shakeout, i.e., rms that were still in operation in the rst quarter of 2003. The results of this
estimation are contained in Table 8. As can be seen, the qualitative result on the positive association
of higher mortality with greater density within one mile still holds.
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Table 7: Hazard estimates for high-tech rms in Texas after 2002:Q4.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Startups .898*** .250*** .863*** .258*** .262***
(.048) (.068) (.048) (.068) (.069)
RivalsLQ > 1 dummy: 1  mile -.068 -.092
(.048) (.050)
RivalsLQ > 1 dummy: > 1  5  -.266 -.347
miles (.192) (.192)
RivalsLQ > 1 dummy: > 5  10  .023 -.018
miles (.143) (.143)
RivalsLQ > 1 dummy: > 10  25  .010 -.061
miles (.102) (.103)
Log number of rivals: 1  mile .380*** .369*** .368***
(.021) (.022) (.024)
Log number of rivals: > 1  5  miles .067 .056 .055
(.056) (.056) (.057)
Log number of rivals: > 5  10  miles -.018 -.007 -.010
(.054) (.053) (.054)
Log number of rivals: > 10  25  miles -.070** -.118** -.092**
(.035) (.037) (.038)
Employment ratio within 25 miles -.776*** -.625***
(.116) (.116)
Employment based HHI: 25  miles -.323**
(.152)
Firm controls No Yes No Yes Yes
Market controls No Yes No Yes Yes
Industry e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of establishments 17753 17753 17753 17753 17753
Number of failures 1884 1884 1884 1884 1884
Wald 2 1545.071 95806.795 1770.763 2083.284 2112.119
*** Denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** denotes statistical signicance at the 5 percent level,
and * statistical signicance at the 10 percent level. Robust standard errors clustered by rms are in parentheses
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5 Conclusions
The results of this analysis, although consistent with Folta et al (2006), Shaver and Flyer (2000),
and Staber (2001), run contrary to conventional beliefs of economists on the net e¤ects of localization
economies. This study makes an important contribution in this realm by virtue of the relatively
greater geographic and establishment-level detail that is employed. Indeed, the narrow spatial analysis
is important. The negative localization e¤ect on establishment survival is conned to a radius of only
one mile or less. This "close quarters" e¤ect would be obscured in an analysis at the MSA or county
level.
We nd these results on localization to be quite plausible and suggestive of the presence of highly
localized knowledge externalities that have the e¤ect of enhancing competition among the very closely-
located rms. However, we recognise that our model cannot empirically identify the separate e¤ects
of localization. We realize, as do Shaver and Flyer (2000), that knowledge spillovers spill both ways.
It is quite possible that rms with relatively strong intellectual property or higher levels of R&D might
perceive that there is more to lose than to gain by a location next door to their rivals or potential rivals
or that the availability of knowledge spillovers would tend to attract weaker rms. We control for this
possibility by estimating the model using only observations on rms that had been in operation for at
least three yrears.
Marginal proximity (between 1 and 25 miles) to the densest industry concentration appears to o¤er
positive net localization economies. As industry density beyond the one mile radius increases, the
e¤ect of density on mortality changes sign. Location near, but not in, a dense spatial concentration
might o¤er key advantages while mitigating continuous knowledge outows associated with continuous
inter-rm worker interactions. The potential labor draw probably extends to at least 25 miles in
even the most congested metropolitan areas while the nearby industry concentration ensures access to
networks of specialized venture capitalists and other specialized business services providers. Access
to these key production inputs is not likely a¤ected signicantly by locating just "o¤ to the side."
This may o¤er an explanation for why Glaeser et al. (1992), in their analysis of industry growth at
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the MSA-level, found no evidence of MAR-type dynamic localization externalities in the high-tech
industries at the MSA-level.10
Despite negative localization economies, start-up rms may be attracted to denser concentrations.
Newer rms are riskier than established rms and are probably less attractive, ceteris paribus, to
potential employees due to the higher likelihood of rm mortality. Location in a dense concentration
can help to o¤set employee risk. That is, if geographic proximity increases worker mobility, as Freedman
(2008) nds, individuals may be more willing to take a job if the hiring rm is embedded in a dense
concentration. Co-location of similar rms in the same o¢ ce tower or campus facilitates inter-rm
employee networking through frequent casual encounters, lunches at the same restaurants, etc. Workers
are able to acquire current employment market information through this localized network at relatively
low cost and use existing personal relationships to advantage in competition for employment openings.
Thus, the same elements that contribute to knowledge spillovers between rms can benet riskier rms
in terms of their employment of workers.
Without o¤ering any explanation for how a spatial industry concentration comes into existence, new
rm entry may partially depend on the rm exits. Rosenthal and Strange (2003) cite Carlton (1983)
as referring to the rm birth potential of an area and suggesting that rm failures provide localized
ingredients for start-ups by releasing factors of production, most notably labor and entrepreneurial
proclivities. Higher failure rates may well contribute to higher start up rates in highly localized and
dense industry concentrations.
10Glaeser et al. (1992) found little evidence of MAR-type externalities across a broader range of industries.
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